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Abstract—This paper presents a novel framework for decen-
tralized monitoring of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), under the
situation where processes are synchronous and the formula is
represented as a tableau. The tableau technique allows one to
construct a semantic tree for the input formula, which can
be used to optimize the decentralized monitoring of LTL in
various ways. Given a system P and an LTL formula ϕ, we
construct a tableau Tϕ. The tableau Tϕ is used for two purposes:
(a) to synthesize an efficient round-robin communication policy
for processes, and (b) to find the minimal ways to decompose
the global formula and communicate partial observations in an
optima way. In our framework, processes can propagate truth
values of atomic formulas, compound formulas, and temporal
formulas depending on the syntactic structure of the input LTL
formula and the observation power of processes. We demonstrate
that this approach of decentralized monitoring based on tableau
construction is more straightforward, more flexible, and more
likely to yield efficient solutions than alternative approaches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Run-time verification (RV) has been recognized as one of
the integral parts of software and hardware design process. RV
is a lightweight formal method that aims to verify (at runtime)
the conformance of the executions of the system under analysis
with respect to some desired properties. Typically the system
is considered as a black box that feeds events to a monitor.
An event usually consists of a set of atomic propositions
that describe some abstract operations in the system. Based
on the received events, the monitor emits verdicts in a truth
domain that indicate whether or not the run complies with
the specification. The technique has been successfully applied
to a number of industrial software systems, providing extra
assurance of behavior correctness [1], [2], [3].
Recently, there has been a growing interest in run-time
verification of distributed systems, that is, systems with mul-
tiple processes and no central observation point. Building
a decentralized runtime monitor for a distributed system is
a non-trivial task since it involves designing a distributed
algorithm that coordinates the monitors in order to reason
consistently about the temporal behavior of the system. The
key challenge is that the monitors have a partial view of the
system and need to account for communication and consensus.
In this work, we consider the decentralized monitoring
of systems under the following setting: (a) processes are
synchronous, and (b) the formula is expressed in a high-level
requirement specification written in LTL and represented as
a tableau. The tableau technique [4] has many applications
in logic. It is used as a method of verifying whether a given
formula is a tautology, as a method of proving semantical
consistency of a set of formulas, and even as an algorithm
for verifying of the validity of arguments. Using the tableau
technique in decentralized monitoring has several advantages.
First, by constructing a tableau for the monitored formula,
we can detect early whether the formula is a tautological
formula or unsatisfiable formula with zero communication
overhead. Second, it allows processes to propagate information
about only feasible branches of the tableau (i.e. successful
branches), where no information will be propagated about
infeasible branches (i.e. failed branches). Third, it helps to find
the minimal way to decompose the formula and communicate
partial observations of processes in an efficient way.
The presented decentralized framework consists mainly of
two parts: (a) a tableau-based algorithm that allows processes
to compute at each state of the input execution trace the
minimal set of formulas whose truth values need to be
propagated, and (b) an LTL inference engine that allows
processes to extract the maximal amount of information from
a received message in case the message contains truth values
of non-atomic formulas. We demonstrate that this approach
of decentralized monitoring based on tableau construction is
more straightforward, more flexible, and more likely to yield
efficient solutions than alternative approaches.
a) Contributions: We summarize our contributions in
this work as follows.
• We present a new decentralized monitoring framework for
LTL formulas under the assumption where processes are
synchronous and the formula is represented as a tableau.
The framework inherits known advantages of the tableau
technique, LTL inference rules, and static monitoring
approaches based on round-robin policies.
• We show how the tableau technique can be used to
optimize decentralized monitoring of LTL (a) by finding
the minimal ways to represent and decompose the global
formula, and (b) by synthesizing efficient round-robin
communication policies based on the semantics of the
constructed tableau of the monitored formula.
• We develop an LTL inference engine that takes into
consideration the observation power of processes and
the syntactic structure of the compound formula being
analyzed. The engine is used by processes to extract the
maximal allowed of information from the received mes-
sages. The inference engine operates with three categories
of rules: (a) inference rules for propositional logic that are
not dependent on the observation power of processes, (b)
inference rules for propositional logic that are dependent
on the observation power of processes, and (c) inference
rules for temporal logic.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we give a brief review of the syntax and
semantics of linear temporal logic LTL and the decentralized
LTL monitoring problem. Then we review the basic tableau
decomposition/expansion rules for LTL.
A. Decentralized LTL Monitoring Problem
A distributed program P = {p1, p2, ..., pn} is a set of n
processes which cooperate with each other in order to achieve
a certain task. Distributed monitoring is less developed and
more challenging than local monitoring: they involve design-
ing a distributed algorithm that monitors another distributed
algorithm. In this work, we assume that no two processes share
a common variable. Each process of the distributed system
emits events at discrete time instances. Each event σ is a set
of actions denoted by some atomic propositions from the set
AP . We denote 2AP by Σ and call it the alphabet of the
system. We assume that the distributed system operates under
the perfect synchrony hypothesis, and that each process sends
and receives messages at discrete instances of time, which are
represented using identifier t ∈ N≥0. An event in a process
pi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is either
• internal event (i.e. an assignment statement),
• message sent, where the local state of pi remains un-
changed, or
• message received, where the local state of pi remains
unchanged.
Since each process sees only a projection of an event to its
locally observable set of actions, we use a projection function
Πi to restrict atomic propositions to the local view of monitor
Mi attached to process pi, which can only observe those of
process pi. For atomic propositions (local to process pi), Πi :
2AP → 2AP , and we denote APi = Πi(AP ), for all i = 1...n.
For events, Πi : 2
Σ → 2Σ and we denote Σi = Πi(Σ) for all
i = 1...n. We assume that ∀i,j≤n,i6=j ⇒ APi ∩ APj = ∅ and
consequently ∀i,j≤n,i6=j ⇒ Σi ∩ Σj = ∅. That is, events are
local to the processes where they are monitored. The system’s
global trace, g = (g1, g2, ..., gn) can now be described as
a sequence of pair-wise unions of the local events of each
process’s traces. We denote the set of all possible events in pi
by Ei and hence the set of all events of P by EP =
⋃n
i=1 Ei.
Finite traces over an alphabet Σ are denoted by Σ∗, while
infinite traces are denoted by Σ∞.
Definition 1: (LTL formulas [5]). The set of LTL formulas
is inductively defined by the grammar
ϕ ::= true | p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | Xϕ | Fϕ | Gϕ | ϕUϕ
where X is read as next, F as eventually (in the future), G as
always (globally), U as until, and p is a propositional variable.
Definition 2: (LTL Semantics [5]). Let w = a0a1... ∈ Σ∞
be a infinite word with i ∈ N being a position. Then we define
the semantics of LTL formulas inductively as follows
• w, i |= true
• w, i |= ¬ϕ iff w, i 6|= ϕ
• w, i |= p iff p ∈ ai
• w, i |= ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 iff w, i |= ϕ1 or w, i |= ϕ2
• w, i |= Fϕ iff w, j |= ϕ for some j ≥ i
• w, i |= Gϕ iff w, j |= ϕ for all j ≥ i
• w, i |= ϕ1Uϕ2 iff ∃k≥i with w, k |= ϕ2 and ∀i≤l<k with
w, l |= ϕ1
• w, i |= Xϕ iff w, i+ 1 |= ϕ
We now review the definition of three-valued semantics
LTL3 that is used to interpret common LTL formulas, as
defined in [6]. The semantics of LTL3 is defined on finite
prefixes to obtain a truth value from the set B3 = {⊤,⊥, ?}.
Definition 3: (LTL3 semantics). Let u ∈ Σ∗ denote a finite
word. The truth value of a LTL3 formula ϕ with respect to u,
denoted by [u |= ϕ], is an element of B3 defined as follows:
[u |= ϕ] =


⊤ if ∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : uσ |= ϕ
⊥ if ∀σ ∈ Σ∞ : uσ 6|= ϕ
? otherwise
Note that according to the semantics of LTL3 the outcome
of the evaluation of ϕ can be inconclusive (?). This happens if
the so far observed prefix u itself is insufficient to determine
how ϕ evaluates in any possible future continuation of u.
Problem 1: (The decentralised monitoring problem). Given
a distributed program P = {p1, p2, ..., pn}, a finite global-
state trace α ∈ Σ∗, an LTL property ϕ, and a set of monitor
processes M = {M1,M2, ...,Mn} such that
• monitor Mi can read the local state of process pi, and
• monitor Mi can communicate with other monitor pro-
cesses.
The problem is then to design an algorithm that allows each
monitor Mi to evaluate ϕ through communicating with other
monitor processes. The problem can be studied under different
settings and different assumptions. However, in this work, we
make a number of assumptions about the class of systems that
can be monitored in our framework.
• A1: the monitored system is a synchronous timed system
with a global clock;
• A2: processes are reliable (i.e., no process is malicious).
It is interesting to note that the synchronous assumption im-
posed in our setting is by no means unrealistic, as in many real-
world systems, communication occurs synchronously.We refer
the reader to [7], [8] in which the authors discussed a number
of interesting examples of protocols for safety-critical systems
in which communication occurs synchronously. Examples
include the FlexRay bus protocol [9], [10] and Deterministic
Ethernet (cf. IEEE802.1 or [11] for an overview).
B. Tableau Construction for LTL
Among the various existing tableau systems for LTL, we
selected Reynolds’s implicit declarative one [4]. The tableau
is unique in that it is wholly traditional in style (labels are sets
of formulas), it is tree shaped tableau construction, and it can
handle repetitive loops and infinite branches quite efficiently.
Given an LTL formula ϕ we construct a direct graph
(tableau) Tϕ using the standard expansion rules for LTL.
Applying expansion rules to a formula leads to a new formula
but with an equivalent semantics. We review here the basic
expansion rules of temporal logic: (1) Gp ≡ p ∧ XGp, (2)
Fp ≡ p ∨XFp, and (3) p Uq ≡ q ∨ (p ∧X(p Uq)). Tableau
expansion rules for propositional logic are very straightforward
and can be described as follows:
• If a branch of the tableau contains a conjunctive formula
A ∧B, add to its leaf the chain of two nodes containing
the formulas A and B.
• If a node on a branch contains a disjunctive formula A∨
B, then create two sibling children to the leaf of the
branch, containing A and B, respectively.
The aim of tableaux is to generate progressively simpler
formulas until pairs of opposite literals are produced or no
other expansion rule can be applied. The labels on the tableau
proposed by Reynolds are just sets of formulas from the
closure set of the original formula. Note that one can use De
Morgan’s laws during the expansion of the tableau, so that
for example, ¬(a ∧ b) is treated as ¬a ∨ ¬b. A node in Tϕ
is called a leaf if it has zero-children. A leaf may be crossed
(x), indicating its branch has failed (i.e., contains opposite
literals), or ticked
√
, indicating its branch is successful. The
whole tableau Tϕ is successful if there is a successful branch,
and in this case we say that the formula ϕ is satisfiable in the
sense that there exists a model that satisfies the formula.
p ∧ (q ∨ r)
p, (q ∨ r)
p, q p, r
√ √
Fig. 1. A tableau for (p∧ (q∨ r))
Gp
p,XGp
Gp
p,XGp
√
Fig. 2. A tableau for Gp
Note that Reynolds [4] introduced a number of new tableau
rules which support a new simple traditional style tree-shaped
tableau for LTL. The new rules (the PRUNE rule and the
LOOP rule) provide a simple way to curtail repetitive branch
extension. We therefore guarantee that the tableau construction
always terminates and returns a semantic graph for the moni-
tored formula including those containing nested operators. For
example, the formula Gp (see Fig. 2) gives rise to a very
repetitive infinite tableau without the LOOP rule, but succeeds
quickly with it. Note that the label (p,XGp) is repeated two
times and hence a fixed-point is reached. In this case we stop
the analysis and declare that the tableau is successful.
III. DECENTRALIZED LTL INFERENCE ENGINE
In this section we describe an inference engine (a set of IF-
THEN inference rules) which consists of a number of infer-
ence rules on propositional logic that can be used by processes
to deduce definite truth values of propositions in compound
formulas. The engine performs syntactic decomposition of the
compound formula using tableau decomposition rules. Before
formalizing the inference rules, we introduce some notations:
• APp, the set of locally observed proposition by process p,
and obs(p) be the set of propositions whose definite truth
values are known to process p either by direct observation
or remote observation through communication;
• LOP (φ), the set of logical operators of formula φ;
• TOP (φ), the set of temporal operators of formula φ; and
• Atoms(φ), the set of atomic propositions in φ.
Our decentralized monitoring algorithm is mainly based on
a three-valued semantics for the future linear temporal logic
LTL, where the interpretation of the third truth value, denoted
by ?, follows Kleene logic [12]. For example, a monitor might
not know the Boolean value of a proposition at a time point
because it is not within its observation power. In this case,
the monitor assigns the proposition the truth value ?. Note
that no verdict is produced if under the current knowledge
the specification evaluates to ?. We can then summarize the
basic cases for three-valued logical operators involving (?) as
follows: (⊤∧ ? =?),(⊥∧ ? = ⊥), (? ∧ ? =?), (⊤∨ ? = ⊤),
(⊥ ∨ ? =?), (? ∨ ? =?), (¬ ? =?). Rules of inference are
written in the following form
Conclusion1 ∧ ... ∧ Conclusionn
Premise1; ...;Premisen
where Premise1; ..., P remisen are a list of premises and
Conclusion1; ...;Conclusionn are the list of logical conse-
quences that can be derived from Premise1; ..., P remisen.
We write (φ)vp to denote that the formula φ has been evaluated
to v ∈ B3 by process p. We classify the inference rules into
three categories: (a) inference rules on propositional logic that
are not dependent on the observation power of processes, (b)
inference rules on propositional logic that are dependent on the
observation power, and (c) inference rules on temporal logic.
• Inference rules on propositional logic not dependent
on the observation power of processes. Rules R1-R2
are straightforward rules which take advantage of the
semantics of logical operators (∧,∨) to deduce definite
truth values of propositions in a formula.
R1 :
(∀i=1...n(ai = ⊤))
(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ ... ∧ an)⊤
R2 :
(∀i=1...n(ai = ⊥))
(a1 ∨ a2 ∨ ... ∨ an)⊥
• Inference rules on propositional logic dependent on
the observation power of processes. An interesting set
of inference rules on propositional logic can be developed
if we allow receiving processes to take into consideration
the observation power of the sending processes when
extracting information from the received compound for-
mulas, as described in rules R3-R10. The rules given at
this category are straightforward rules except rules R9
and R10, which we will explain later by an example.
The rules work as follows: depending on the syntactic
structure of the compound formula φ and its truth value
as evaluated by a sending process p, a receiving process
q can deduce definite truth values of some propositions in
φ. Therefore, these rules should be viewed as inference
rules used by process q after receiving a message from
process p containing truth values of compound formulas.
Recall that we assume here that processes know the
observation power of each other.
R3 :
(∀ai∈obs(p)(ai = ⊤))q
(a1 ∧ a2 ∧ ... ∧ an)?p; ({a1, ..., an} ∩ obs(p)) 6= ∅
R4 :
(∀ai∈obs(p)(ai = ⊥))q
(a1 ∨ a2 ∨ ... ∨ an)?p; ({a1, ..., an} ∩ obs(p)) 6= ∅
R5:
(a = ⊥ ∧ b = ⊥)q
(a ∨ (b ∧ c))⊥p ; a, b ∈ obs(p)
R6:
(a = ⊥ ∧ b = ⊤)q
(a ∨ (b ∧ c))?p; a, b ∈ obs(p)
R7:
(a = ⊤ ∧ b = ⊥)q
(a ∧ (b ∨ c))?p; a, b ∈ obs(p)
R8:
(a = ⊤ ∧ b = ⊤)q
(a ∧ (b ∨ c))⊤p ; a, b ∈ obs(p)
R9:
(∀i=1..n(∀a∈(Atoms(φi)∩obs(p))(a = ⊥))∧
∀i=1..n(∀¬a∈(Atoms(φi)∩obs(p)))(a = ⊤)))q
(φ1 ∨ ... ∨ φn)⊥p ; ∀i=1..n(TOP (φi) = ∅); ∀i=1..n(LOP (φi) = {∧};
∀i=1..n(Atoms(φi) > 1); ∀i=1..n((|Atoms(φi) ∩ obs(p)| = 1))
R10:
(∀i=1..n(∀a∈(Atoms(φi)∩obs(p))(a = ⊤))∧
∀i=1..n(∀¬a∈(Atoms(φi)∩obs(p)))(a = ⊥)))q
(φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn)⊤p ; ∀i=1..n(TOP (φi) = ∅); ∀i=1..n(LOP (φi) = {∨};
∀i=1..n(Atoms(φi) > 1); ∀i=1..n((|Atoms(φi) ∩ obs(p)| = 1))
We now turn to discuss rules R9 and R10. Note that
rule R10 is the dual of rule R9 and we therefore explain
only R9. The rule can be used if the syntactic structure
of the complex compound formula Φ = (φ1 ∨ ... ∨ φn)
satisfies the following conditions: (a) the only logical
operator appearing in subformula φi is {∧}, (b) φi has
no temporal operator (c) process p observes at most
one proposition in each subformula φi, and (d) Φ is
evaluated to ⊥ by p. Then once a process q receives a
message from p containing the truth value of Φ it can
deduce that all positive propositions in Φ observed by
p have truth values ⊥ and all negative propositions in Φ
observed by p have truth values ⊤. For example, consider
Φ = ((a∧b)∨(¬c∧d)), where process p observes {a, c}
and evaluates Φ to ⊥. Then once q receives a message
from p containing the truth value of Φ it can deduce that
a = ⊥ and c = ⊤.
• Inference rules for temporal logic. We discuss here
two inference rules for temporal operators. Note that
to develop useful inference rules for temporal logic we
choose to restrict the scope of temporal operators to
a specific time step n, where n can be chosen to be
the current time step at which the formula is evaluated.
Such restriction allows us to reduce temporal formulas
into propositional formulas by using unfolding rules for
temporal operators. For example, we can unfold the
formula G(n)(φ) to (φ(0)∧ ...∧φ(n)) given the semantics
of the operator G, so that we apply the unfolding rule
of the G operator n-times. Similar unfolding rules can
be applied to formula F (n)(φ). The resulting unfolding
formulas are compound propositional formulas.
R11 :
(∀t=0...n(φ(t) = ⊤))
(G(n)(φ))⊤
R12 :
(∀t=0...n(φ(t) = ⊥))
(F (n)(φ))⊥
The advantage of having inference rules on temporal logic as
given in rules R11-R12 is that they allow distributed processes
to deduce information (i.e. truth values of propositions in the
global LTL formula) not just in one particular state of the
system, but also in a sequence of states. That is, from a truth
value of a single temporal formula, processes may deduce
information about n past states. This is extremely useful in
decentralized monitoring, as it allows processes to propagate
their observations in a more efficient way. To demonstrate the
usefulness of these rules in decentralized monitoring, consider
the following example.
Example 1:
Suppose we have a temporal formula Φ = F (a ∨ b ∨ c)
which is monitored in a decentralized fashion by a group of
processes {A,B,C}. Let us denote (a∨ b∨ c) by φ. Suppose
that at time step t > 0 process A told processB that Φ(t) = ⊥.
Then from the syntactic structure of Φ and the semantics of
the temporal operator F (see rule R12), process B can deduce
that φ(0) = ⊥∧ ...∧φ(t) = ⊥. Since φ is a compound formula
whose syntactic structure matches the one given in rule R2, B
needs to apply R2 on φ from τ = 0 to τ = t. It then deduces
that the truth values of the atoms a, b and c from τ = 0 to
τ = t are ⊥. That is, a(τ) = b(τ) = c(τ) = ⊥ for all τ ∈ [0, t].
In some cases processes may need to apply multiple infer-
ence rules on the same compound formula depending on the
syntactic structure of the formula. So that if the compound for-
mula can be decomposed into multiple compound formulas of
the forms given in rules R1-R10, then multiple inference rules
will be applied to derive definite truth values of the atomic
propositions in the original compound formula. Consider the
following example to demonstrate this.
Example 2:
Suppose we have a compound formula Φ = ((a∧ b)∨ (c∧
(d ∨ e))) and that a process p has APp = {a, d, e}. Suppose
that at time step t the process p observes that a = d = e = ⊥
and hence evaluates the formula Φ to ⊥. Suppose further that p
propagates the truth value of Φ to some other process q which
knows that p observes the atoms {a, d, e}. Note that Φ can
be decomposed into two compound subformulas φ1 = (a∧ b)
and φ2 = (c ∧ (d ∨ e)). Since p told q that Φ = ⊥ then q can
deduce that φ1 = ⊥ and φ2 = ⊥. In this case process q can
deduce that a = ⊥ ∧ d = ⊥ ∧ e = ⊥.
IV. COMPUTING OBSERVATION POWER OF PROCESSES
In this section, we discuss the problem of computing the
observation power of distributed processes in a decentralized
fashion, the set obs(t)(pi) (i.e. the set of atomic propositions
whose truth value are known to process pi at time step t).
The first intuitive way of computing the observation power of
a process pi is to assume that pi knows the truth values of its
local atomic propositions from the initial time step up to the
current time step. We formalize this as follows
obs(t)(pi) = obs
(0)(pi) ∪ ... ∪ obs(t)(pi) = AP (0)pi ∪ ... ∪ AP (t)pi
where obs(t)(pi) represents the set of atomic propositions
whose truth values are known to process p up to time step t.
Note that the above formula does not take into consideration
the fact that processes communicate with each other and
that the observation power of processes can be enhanced
through communication. It is thus not limited to their local
atomic propositions. However, computing the set obs(t)(pi)
while considering remote observations made by pi is crucial
in our decentralized monitoring framework as it makes the
inference rules R3-R12 more powerful in the sense that more
information may be extracted when applying these rules.
Since processes use static communication scheme in which
the order at which observations of processes are propagated
is fixed between states, they can then compute precisely the
observation power of each other. Let |πi,j | be the number
of communication rounds needed for process pi to influence
the information state of process pj , where |πi,j | represents
the length of the communication path between nodes (pi, pj).
Note that in our framework we assume that each process
can send at most one message at any communication round.
Therefore, when process pi makes a new observationOi at step
t, then process pj knows about Oi at time step (t + |pi,j |).
So given a static communication scheme in which the length
of communication path |πi,j | for any pair (pi, pj) is prior
knowledge, the observation power of a process pi at time step
t ≥ 0 can then be computed as follows:
obs(t)(pi) = ((AP
(0)
pi ∪ ... ∪ AP (t)pi ) ∪
(∀τ=0...t,j=0..n∧j 6=i(
⋃
(t−τ)≥|pij,i|
(AP
(τ)
pj ))))
(1)
That is, at time step t, process pi knows the truth values
of its local propositions from time 0 to time t and the truth
values of all propositions of process pj from time 0 to time
τ , given that (t− τ) ≥ |πj,i|. To demonstrate formula (1) let
us consider the following example.
Example 3:
Suppose that processes {A,B,C} communicate with each
other using the fixed communication scheme comm = (A→
B → C → A) and that comm is common knowledge among
processes, where the direction of the arrow represents the
direction of communication. We can then compute for instance
the observation power of processes A,B and C at step t = 2
as follows
obs(2)(A) = {AP (0)A , AP (1)A , AP (2)A , AP (0)C , AP (1)C , AP (0)B }
obs(2)(B) = {AP (0)A , AP (1)A , AP (0)B , AP (1)B , AP (2)B , AP (0)C }
obs(2)(C) = {AP (0)B , AP (1)B , AP (0)C , AP (1)C , AP (2)C , AP (0)A }
Note that when the set obs(2)(B) contains the set AP
(0)
A it
means that B knows the truth values of all propositions in the
set APA at time step 0. To demonstrate how inference rules
can be used in decentralized monitoring, let us consider the
following example.
Example 4:
Suppose that processes {A,B,C} communicate with each
other using the static communication scheme comm = (A→
B → C → A) and that APA = {a1, a2}, APB = {b}, and
APC = {c}. The property to be monitored by processes is
ϕ = F (a1 ∧ ¬a2 ∧ b ∧ ¬c). Let us denote the formula (a1 ∧
¬a2∧b∧¬c) by φ. We first construct a tableau for ϕ using the
tableau system of Section II-B (see Fig. 3). Suppose that at
state g0 (the initial state) the propositions of the formula have
the following truth values a1 = ⊤, a2 = ⊥, b = ⊤ and c = ⊥.
For brevity, we describe only the information propagated from
process A to process B concerning state g0.
Fφ
φ ∨XFφ
φ Fφ
a1,¬a2, b, c φ ∨XF
√ √
Fig. 3. A tableau for Fφ, where φ = (a1 ∧ ¬a2 ∧ b ∧ c)
• At time step t = 0 process A sends (φ =?) to B. Then
using rule R3 processB deduces that a1 = ⊤ and a2 = ⊥
at state g0 as A observes both a1, a2.
• At time step t = 1 process A sends (φ =?) to B. Then
using rule R3 again process B deduces that a1 = ⊤ and
a2 = ⊥ and c = ⊤ at state g0 as A observes a1, a2 and
has already received a message from C at time step t = 0
about the truth value of proposition c at state g0. At this
step, process B knows truth values of all propositions at
state g0 as b is locally observed by B.
V. PROPAGATING OBSERVATIONS IN AN OPTIMAL WAY
In this section we describe an algorithm that allows pro-
cesses to propagate their observations in an optimal way. Since
we assume that processes use a static communication scheme
based on some round-robin policy, then they can compute
precisely the observation power of each other. Suppose that
we use an RR communication policy in which process p sends
its observations to process q. Then instead of allowing p to
propagate its entire knowledge to q, it propagates only the
set of observations that are not known to q. We mean by
observations the set of atomic propositions whose definite truth
values are known to p. The set of observations that p needs
to propagate to q at time step t can be computed as follow
obs(t)(p→ q) = (obs(t)(p)− obs(t)(q))
= (AP
(τ)
kp
−AP (τ)kq ) ∪ ... ∪ (AP
(t)
kp
−AP (t)kq )
where the set obs(t)(p → q) represents the set of new
observations that process p needs to propagate to process q,
AP
(τ)
kp
represents the set of atomic propositions whose definite
truth values are known to p at time step τ , where τ represents
the earliest time step of the trace at which a new observation
has been made by process p. Note that process p knows the set
of propositions whose definite truth values are known to q from
time 0 to time t. This is due to the assumption that processes
use a static communication scheme in which the order at
which observations are propagated is fixed between states. It
is interesting to note that process p propagates not just truth
values of its locally observed propositions but also truth values
of propositions observed by other processes. Let MinList be
the set of minimal sets of formulas whose truth values need
to be propagated from steps τ to t. The set MinList can be
computed as follows
MinList = MinList(τ) ∪ .... ∪MinList(t)
We now summarize the steps that process p needs to follow
in order to compute the set MinList.
1) For each k ∈ [τ, t] process p computes the set Mk =
(AP
(k)
kp
−AP (k)kq ): the set of propositions at step k whose
truth values are known to p but not known to q.
2) For each Mk process p computes the set Minlist(k)
using Algorithm 1.
3) It then combines the sets Minlist(k) for all k ∈ [τ, t] to
obtain MinList.
In our setting we assume that each process maintains a truth
table at each state of the monitored trace, which consists of
the set of formulas in the resulting tableau of the monitored
formula. The truth tables maintain only the set of non-atomic
formulas that match the syntactic structure of formulas in
the inference rules R1-R12, in addition to the set of atomic
propositions of the main formula. At each time step τ , process
p examines the non-atomic formulas in its truth tables to
compute the minimal set of formulas whose truth values need
to be propagated (see Algorithm 1). The truth table consists of
three columns: the set of formulas, their truth values, and their
unique index values. We view the table Tτ as a set of entries of
the form (f, val, index). The set CompoundFormulas used
in the algorithm represents the set of compound formulas in
the inference rules R1-R12. The operation DeductionSet(φ)
returns the set of atomic propositions in the formula φ whose
definite truth values can be deduced. As one can see Algorithm
1 consists of two phases: (a) the exploration phase in which
non-atomic formulas in the truth table Tτ are examined, and
(b) the refinement phase in which redundant formulas in the
list MinListτ (if any) are removed. Note that it is possible to
have a formula whose deduction list is subset of the deduction
list of another formula or they have some atomic propositions
in common. The refinement phase is then used to detect such
cases and remove redundant information. This ensures that
observations are propagated in an optimal way.
VI. STATIC MONITORING APPROACHES
The knowledge state of processes in decentralized moni-
toring increases monotonically over time due to local and
remote observations. It is therefore necessary to have an
efficient communication strategy that allows processes to
propagate only necessary observations. The propagation of
monitoring information from one peer to the other in our
framework follows a static communication strategy based on
a round-robin scheduling policy. The advantage of using a
static communication strategy in decentralized monitoring is
that processes can compute precisely the knowledge state
of each other and communicate only new observations to
their neighbor processes (i.e. no redundant information will
be propagated). This helps to reduce significantly the size
of propagated messages, which is crucial when monitoring
large-scale distributed systems (systems with huge number of
processes) or systems running over wireless sensor networks.
To develop efficient static RR policies for decentralized
monitoring we use ranking functions to rank processes (i.e.
assign a unique value to each process) using some interesting
criteria that take into consideration the observation power of
processes and the syntactic structure of the formula. The values
assigned to the processes using ranking functions will be used
then to specify the order of communication in the round-robin
policy. We consider here two different ranking strategies.
1) For the first strategy, a process that contributes to the truth
value of the formula via a larger number of propositions
receives higher priority in the round-robin order; if multi-
ple processes have the same number of propositions, then
the order is fixed by an (externally provided) PID. The
intuition behind choosing such a strategy is that processes
that observe more propositions of the formula own more
information about the global trace of the system, and
hence specifying the order of communication in such a
way may help to detect any violation somewhat faster.
1: Inputs : (Mτ , Tτ , CompoundFormulas)
2: Output : MinListτ = ∅
3: for each entry ∈ Tτ do ⊲ Exploration phase
4: if Mτ ∩ Atoms(entry.f) 6= ∅ then
5: if MatchSynt(entry.f, φ) for any φ ∈ CompoundFormulas then
6: if entry.val = φ.val then
7: if DeductionSet(entry.f) 6∈ DeductionSet(φ) for any φ ∈MinListτ then
8: add (entry.index, entry.val) to MinListτ
9: end if
10: end if
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: for each φ ∈MinListτ do ⊲ Refinement phase
15: if DeductionSet(φ) ⊆ DeductionSet(ψ) for any ψ ∈MinList then
16: remove φ from MinList
17: end if
18: if DeductionSet(ψ) ⊆ DeductionSet(φ) for any ψ ∈MinList then
19: remove ψ from MinList
20: end if
21: if DeductionSet(φ) ⊆ (⋃ψ∈MinList(DeductionSet(ψ))) then
22: remove φ from MinList
23: end if
24: end for
25: if there exist a ∈Mτ such that a 6⊆ (
⋃
φ∈MinList(DeductionSet(φ))) then
26: add (index(a), val(a)) to MinList
27: end if
28: return MinListτ
Algorithm 1: Computing minimal set of formulas for process p at step τ
2) For the second strategy the tableau is considered, where
we rank processes based on their observation power while
taking into consideration the structure of the formula ϕ.
Let Tϕ be a tableau of ϕ. Then the process that contributes
to a larger number of branches receives higher priority
in the order of communication. Note that the tableau
technique allows one to construct a semantic tree for
the monitored formula, where each branch of the tree
represents a way to satisfy the formula. We believe that
this strategy would help to speed up the RV process.
We now give an example to demonstrate how one can
synthesize an RR policy using the above described strategies.
Example 5: Suppose we have a distributed system S =
{A,B,C} and a property ϕ = G(a1∧¬a2∧b1)∨F (b2∧c) of S
that we would like to monitor in a decentralized fashion, where
APA = {a1, a2}, APB = {b1, b2}, and APC = {c}. From
the syntactic structure of ϕ, it is easy to see that the tableau
Tϕ constructed consists of three branches, where one branch
corresponds to formula G(a1 ∧ ¬a2 ∧ b1) and two branches
correspond to formula F (b2 ∧ c). Hence the two strategies
yield different RR policies as follows
Comm1 = A→ B → C → A
Comm2 = B → C → A→ B
VII. DECENTRALIZED MONITORING ALGORITHM
Our decentralized monitoring algorithm consists of two
phases: setup and monitor. The setup phase creates the mon-
itors and defines their communication topology. The monitor
phase allows the monitors to begin monitoring and propagating
information to reach a verdict when possible. We first describe
the steps of the setup phase.
• Each process constructs a tableau Tϕ for ϕ using the
method of Section II-B.
• Each process then refines the constructed tree Tϕ by re-
moving redundant formulas and infeasible branches from
the tree. Note that in some cases the constructed tableau
of an LTL formula may contain redundant formulas due
to repetitive loops (see Fig. 2).
• Each process constructs a truth table that consists of tem-
poral formulas and compound formulas in Tϕ that match
the syntactic structure of the formulas in the inference
rules R1-R12, in addition to the atomic formulas of ϕ.
• Each process assigns a unique index value to each for-
mula in the constructed truth table. We assume here that
all processes use the same enumerating procedure when
assigning index values to the formulas.
The advantage of assigning unique index values to the for-
mulas in the constructed truth table is that it allows processes
|trace| #msg. |msg.| |mem|
|ϕ| BF DM1 DM2 BF DM1 DM2 BF DM1 DM2 BF DM1 DM2
1 1.56 2.84 2.64 4.107 5.5 4.93 86.5 21.3 22.7 44.2 6.93 6.93
2 2.77 3.54 3.85 6.285 6.9 6.4 318 49.2 46.4 156 8.72 8.72
3 6.79 9.36 8.56 10.554 17.5 17.9 3,540 166 173 458 12.4 12.4
4 17.8 20.57 19.23 17.667 37.6 36.9 530 370 357 1,100 13.3 13.3
5 27.3 43.24 35.3 28.125 74.7 67.0 4,650 877 862 2630 14.4 14.4
6 61.2 64.16 62.2 35.424 115.7 113 8,000 1,250 1,160 5,830 14.0 14.0
TABLE I
BENCHMARKS FOR 1000 RANDOMLY GENERATED LTL FORMULAS OF SIZE |ϕ| (AVERAGES)
|trace| #msg. |msg.| |mem|
|ϕ| BF DM1 DM2 BF DM1 DM2 BF DM1 DM2 BF DM1 DM2
abs 4.65 5.26 5.15 4.46 6.25 6.15 1,150 115 110 496 16.4 14.9
exis 27.9 32.4 31.5 19.7 22.5 20.8 1,100 525 521 376 22.6 21.8
bexis 43.6 47.8 45.3 31.6 33.7 32.4 55,000 25784 25415 28,200 27.5 25.6
univ 5.86 6.8 6.2 5.92 5.95 5.82 2,758 155 138 498 24.7 22.5
prec 54.8 57.6 54.5 25.4 27.9 26.9 8,625 785 755 663 35.4 34.9
resp 622 655 622 425 545 515 22,000 1225 1211 1,540 19.8 17.5
precc 4.11 5.45 5.2 4.81 6.25 5.95 5,184 378 356 1,200 17.4 15.7
respc 427 452 444 381 415 409 9,000 2875 2799 4,650 23.4 22.1
consc 325 355 324 201 243 234 7,200 1230 1223 2,720 16.5 15.8
TABLE II
BENCHMARKS FOR 1000 GENERATED LTL PATTERN FORMULAS (AVERAGES)
to propagate truth values of formulas as pairs of the form
(idx(φ), val), where idx(φ) is the index value of the formula
φ and val ∈ B3, which helps to reduce the size of propagated
messages. We now summarize the actual monitoring steps in
the form of an explicit algorithm that describes how local
monitors operate and make decisions:
1) [Read next event]. Read next σi ∈ Σi (initially each
process reads σ0).
2) [Compute minimal set of formulas to be transmitted]. Use
Algorithm 1 to derive MinListgip .
3) [Compute the receiving process]. For static approaches,
the receiving process of some process p is fixed between
states and computed according to some round-robin com-
munication policy, as described in Section VI.
4) [Send truth value of formulas in MinListgip ]. Propagate
the truth value of formulas in MinListgip as pairs of the
form (idx(φ), val) to the receiving process.
5) [Evaluate the formula ϕ and return]. If a definite verdict
of ϕ is found return it. That is, if ϕ = ⊤ return ⊤, if
ϕ = ⊥ return ⊥.
6) [Go to step 1]. If the trace has not been finished or a
decision has not been made then go to step 1.
We now turn to discuss the basic properties of our decen-
tralized monitoring framework. Let |=D be the satisfaction
relation on finite traces in the decentralized setting and |=C
be the satisfaction relation on finite traces in the centralized
setting, where both |=D and |=C yield values from the same
truth domain. Note that in a centralized monitoring algorithm
we assume that there is a central process that observes the
entire global trace of the system being monitored, while in our
decentralized monitoring algorithm processes observe part of
the trace, perform remote observation, and use some deduction
rules in order to evaluate the property. The following theorems
stating the soundness and completeness of our decentralized
monitoring algorithm.
Theorem 1: (Soundness). Let ϕ ∈ LTL and α ∈ Σ∗. Then
α |=D ϕ = ⊤/⊥ ⇒ α |=C ϕ = ⊤/⊥.
Soundness means that all verdicts (truth values taken from a
truth-domain) found by the decentralized monitoring algorithm
for a global trace α with respect to the property ϕ are actual
verdicts that would be found by a centralized monitoring
algorithm that have access to the trace α.
Theorem 2: (Completeness). Let ϕ ∈ LTL and α ∈ Σ∗.
Then α |=C ϕ = ⊤/⊥⇒ α |=D ϕ = ⊤/⊥.
Completeness means that all verdicts found by the central-
ized monitoring algorithm for some trace α with respect to
the property ϕ will eventually be found by the decentralized
monitoring algorithm. The soundness and completeness of
our monitoring strategies can be inferred from the soundness
of inference rules R1-R12, Algorithm 1, and the tableau
technique. The consistency property (i.e., no two different
monitors Mi,Mj decide differently) of both approaches is
inferred from the tableau approach.
Monitoring formulas with nested operators: our framework
can also handle formulas with nested operators (e.g., G(φ⇒
Fψ)), where the operators are expanded repeatedly using usual
tableau expansion rules and the new LOOP checking rule and
BRUNE rules introduced by Reynolds which can be used to
halt the expansion of infinite branches. The process stops at
trivial cases or when a certain loop condition is met (i.e. a fixed
point has been reached). Processes can then exchange truth
values of atomic formulas, compound formulas, or temporal
formulas depending on the tableau of the main formula. We
refer the reader to [4] for more details and examples.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We have evaluated our static monitoring strategies against
the LTL decentralized monitoring approach of Bauer and
Falcone [7], in which the authors developed a monitoring
algorithm for LTL based on the formula-progression tech-
nique [13]. The formula progression technique takes a tem-
poral formula φ and a current assignment I over the liter-
als of φ as inputs and returns a new formula after acting
I on φ. The idea is to rewrite a temporal formula when
an event e is observed or received to a formula which
represents the new requirement that the monitored system
should fulfill for the remaining part of the trace. To compare
our monitoring approach with their decentralized algorithm,
we use the tableau system of Section II-B, which allows
one to efficiently construct a semantic graph (tableau) for
the input formula. We also use the tool DECENTMON3
(http://decentmon3.forge.imag.fr/) in our eval-
uation, which is a tool dedicated to decentralized monitoring.
The tool takes as input multiple traces, corresponding to
the behavior of a distributed system, and an LTL formula.
The main reason behind choosing DECENTMON3 in our
evaluation is that it makes similar assumptions to our presented
approach. Furthermore, DecentMon3 improves the original
DecentMon tool developed in [7] by limiting the growth of
the size of local obligations and hence it may reduce the
size of propagated messages in decentralized monitoring. We
believe that by choosing the tool DECENTMON3 as baseline
for comparison we make the evaluation much fairer.
We denote by BF the monitoring approach of Bauer and
Falcone, DM1 the first RR strategy of this paper in which
processes are ordered according to the number of propositions
they contribute to in the formula, and DM2 the second RR
strategy of this paper in which processes are ordered according
to the number of branches they contribute to in the tableau of
the monitored formula. We compare the approaches against
two benchmarks of formulas: randomly generated formulas
(see Table I) and benchmark for patterns of formulas [14] (see
Table II). In Tables I and II, the following metrics are used:
#msg, the total number of exchanged messages; |msg|, the
total size of exchanged messages (in bits); |trace|, the average
length of the traces needed to reach a verdict; and |mem|,
the memory in bits needed for the structures (i.e., formulas
plus state for our algorithm). For example, the first line in
Table I says that we monitored 1,000 randomly generated LTL
formulas of size 1. On average, traces were of length 1.56
when one of the local monitors in approach BF came to a
verdict, and of length 2.84 and 2.64 when one of the monitors
in DM1 and DM2 came to a verdict.
A. Evaluation of randomly generated formulas
Following the evaluation scheme of Falcone et al. [7], [15],
we evaluate the performance of each approach against a set
of random LTL formulas of various sizes. For each size of
formula (from 1 to 6), DECENTMON3 randomly generated
1,000 formulas. The result of comparing the three monitoring
approaches can be seen in Table I. The first column of these
tables shows the size of the monitored LTL formulas. Note that
we measure the formula size in terms of operator entailment
inside it; for instance, G(a ∧ b) ∨ G(c ∧ d) ∨ F (e) is of
size 3. However, experiments show that operator entailment
is more representative of how difficult it is to progress it
in a decentralized manner [7], [15]. As shown in Table I
our decentralized monitoring approaches lead to significant
reduction on both the size of propagated messages and the
memory consumption compared to the BF approach (i.e.
the formula progression technique). This demonstrates the
effectiveness of the presented static round-robin approaches
and the inference LTL engine in decentralized monitoring.
B. Benchmarks for Patterns of formulas
We also compared the three approaches with more real-
istic specifications obtained from specification patterns [16].
Table II reports the verification results for different kinds
of patterns (absence, existence, bounded existence, universal,
precedence, response, precedence chain, response chain, con-
strained chain). The actual specification formulas are available
at [14]. We generated also 1000 formulas monitored over the
same setting (processes are synchronous and reliable). For this
benchmark we generated formulas as follows. For each pattern,
we randomly select one of its associated formulas. Such a
formula is “parametrized” by some atomic propositions from
the alphabet of the distributed system which are randomly
instantiated. For this benchmark (see Table II), the presented
approaches lead also to significant reduction on both the size of
messages and the amount of memory consumption compared
to the optimized version of BF algorithm (DECENTMON3).
C. Discussion and Conclusions Based on Evaluation Results
Comparing the decentralized monitoring algorithms, the
number of messages when using BF is always lower but the
size of messages and the memory consumption is much bigger
and by several orders of magnitude than our approaches.
However, the approach DM2 showed better performance (on
most of the cases) than DM1 in terms of the number and size
of propagated messages. This demonstrates the advantage of
using tableau in synthesizing an RR communication policy
for decentralized monitoring. A key drawback of using pro-
gression in decentralized monitoring (BF) is the continuous
growth of the size of local obligations with the length of the
trace, which imposes heavy overhead after a certain number
of events. While progression minimizes communication in
terms of number of messages, it has the risk of saturating the
communication device as processes send their obligations as
rewritten temporal formulas. On the other hand, processes in
our static monitoring approaches (DM1 and DM2) propagate
their observations as pairs of the form (idx(φ), val) (rather
that rewritten LTL formulas), where observations may be prop-
agated as truth values of temporal and compound formulas.
Furthermore, in our approaches, processes propagate only new
observations to their neighbor processes, which helps to reduce
significantly the size of propagated messages.
IX. RELATED WORK
Several monitoring algorithms have been developed for
verifying distributed systems at runtime [17], [7], [8], [15],
[18], [19]. They make different assumptions on the system
model and thus target different kinds of distributed systems
and they handle different specification languages.
Sen et al. [17] propose a monitoring framework for safety
properties of distributed systems using the past-time linear
temporal logic. However, the algorithm is unsound. The eval-
uation of some properties may be overlooked in their frame-
work. This is because monitors gain knowledge about the state
of the system by piggybacking on the existing communication
among processes. That is, if processes rarely communicate,
then monitors exchange very little information, and hence,
some violations of the properties may remain undetected.
Bauer and Falcone [7] propose a decentralized framework
for runtime monitoring of LTL. The framework is constructed
from local monitors which can only observe the truth value
of a predefined subset of propositional variables. The local
monitors can communicate their observations in the form of
a (rewritten) LTL formula towards its neighbors. Mostafa and
Bonakdarpour [19] propose similar decentralized LTL mon-
itoring framework, but truth value of propositional variables
rather than rewritten formulas are shared.
The work of Falcone et al. [15] proposes a general decen-
tralized monitoring algorithm in which the input specification
is given as a deterministic finite-state automaton rather than
an LTL formula. Their algorithm takes advantage of the
semantics of finite-word automata, and hence they avoid the
monitorability issues induced by the infinite-words semantics
of LTL. They show that their implementation outperforms
the Bauer and Falcone decentralized LTL algorithm [7] using
several monitoring metrics.
Colombo and Falcone [20] propose a new way of organizing
monitors called choreography, where monitors are organized
as a tree across the distributed system, and each child feeds
intermediate results to its parent. The proposed approach tries
to minimize the communication induced by the distributed
nature of the system and focuses on how to automatically split
an LTL formula according to the architecture of the system.
El-Hokayem and Falcone [21] propose a new framework for
decentralized monitoring with new data structure for symbolic
representation and manipulation of monitoring information in
decentralized monitoring. In their framework, the formula is
modeled as an automaton where transitions of the monitored
automaton are labeled with Boolean expressions over atomic
propositions of the system.
A closer work to our work in this paper is the one of
Basin et al. [22], in which the authors use the 3-valued
logic (strong Kleene logic) and an AND-OR graph to verify
the observed system behavior at runtime with respect to
specifications written in the real-time logic MTL. However,
in our work we use a different construction to decompose and
analyze the formula where we use the tableau graph, and we
study the optimality problem in distributed monitoring with
respect to both the number and size of transmitted messages
at each state of the trace being monitored. Furthermore, in our
framework we allow monitors to use deduction rules to infer
truth values of propositions from the messages they receive,
where processes can propagate both atomic and compound
formulas depending on both local and remote observations.
Our framework differs from the previous proposed decen-
tralized frameworks in the literature in that it is mainly based
on the tableau construction, where a semantic tree is con-
structed for the monitored formula using the tableau technique.
The constructed semantic tree is used then to synthesize an
efficient communication strategy for the distributed system and
to find the minimal ways to decompose the formula. Further-
more, our framework uses an inference engine for LTL which
operates with different sets of inferences rules. The inference
engine allows processes to propagate their observations at each
state of the monitored trace in an optimal way, while ensuring
that only new observations are propagated.
X. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have presented an efficient decentralized monitoring
framework for LTL formulas using the tableau technique. The
framework consists of two parts: (a) an algorithm that allows
processes to compute at each state of the input execution
trace the minimal set of formulas whose truth values need
to be propagated, and (b) an LTL inference engine that allows
processes to extract the maximal amount of information from
the received messages. The propagation of monitoring infor-
mation from one peer to the other in our framework follows a
static communication strategy based on a round-robin schedul-
ing policy. The advantage of using a static communication
strategy in decentralized monitoring is that processes can
compute precisely the knowledge state of each other and hence
communicate only new observations. This helps to reduce
significantly the size of propagated messages which is highly
desirable when monitoring large-scale distributed systems. In
future work, we aim to improve the static approaches by
organizing processes into groups and then assign to each
group a unique sub-formula of the main formula based on
the semantics of the constructed tableau of the formula. This
should help to reduce further the size of propagated messages.
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